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Abstract—The popularity of smart cars is increasing around
the world as they offer a wide range of services and conveniences.
These smart cars are equipped with a variety of sensors generat-
ing a large amount of data, many of which are sensitive. Besides,
there are multiple parties involved in a lifespan of a smart car,
such as manufacturers, car owners, government agencies, and
third-party service providers who also produce data about the
vehicle. In addition to managing and sharing data amongst these
entities in a secure and privacy-friendly way which is a great
challenge itself, there exists a trust deficit about some types
of data as they remain under the custody of the car owner
(e.g. satellite navigation and mileage data) and can easily be
manipulated. In this paper, we propose a blockchain supported
architecture enabling the owner of a smart car to create an
immutable record of every data, called the autobiography of a car,
generated within its lifespan. We also explain how the trust about
this record is guaranteed by the immutability characteristic of the
blockchain. Furthermore, the paper describes how the proposed
architecture enables a secure and privacy-friendly sharing of
smart car data between different parties in a secure yet privacy-
friendly manner.
Index Terms—Smart Car, Autobiography, Data Sharing,
blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing popularities of smart cars imposes a
significant challenge from the viewpoint of the management
and the secure and privacy-friendly sharing of the data gen-
erated by such vehicles. The reason is manifold. Firstly,
multiple parties (e.g., manufacturers, government authorities,
service providers) are involved who produce data about the
car throughout its lifespan and keep records in their database.
Secondly, smart cars are embedded with a wide range of
sensors which continuously generate data, but the lack of a
proper mechanism to enable the car owners from sharing this
information with the third party service providers (e.g. an
insurer) creates the ‘silos’ of information for any particular car.
Therefore, there is no global or holistic view of the information
related to a specific vehicle.
This problem is aggravated when we consider that many
of such data is private in nature, e.g. driving habit, driving
locations and so on. One of the main reasons why the
manufacturers do not allow the sharing of individuals’ data
is the security and privacy threats such as location tracking or
remote hijacking of the car. Therefore, the management and
sharing of such data must be accomplished in a secure and
privacy-friendly way. We argue that blockchain, a disruptive
technology that has found many applications from cryptocur-
rencies to smart contracts, can be a potential solution to these
challenges.
Contributions. We propose a blockchain-based architecture
to allow different stakeholders to join a common platform,
to allow owners of smart cars to build a holistic view of
immutable records, called autobiographies, of their smart cars
and to share data with other parties in a secure, transparent
and auditable way. We also qualitatively argue the resilience
of the architecture against common security attacks using a
threat model.
Structure. In Section II, we provide a brief description
about blockchain and smart car and its underlying issues. Sec-
tion III provides a mathematical model to define what we mean
by the term autobiography of a smart car. Section IV presents a
threat model, a requirement analysis and the proposed system
architecture along with a discussion of probable design issues.
Finally, we conclude in Section V with hints of future work.
II. BACKGROUND
Two disruptive technologies, Blockchain and Smart Car, are
amongst the most discussed subjects of recent time. These two
apparently unrelated topics, however, share a close tie-up that
can be capitalized on building the architecture for the next-
generation applications to manage and share smart car data in
a secure and privacy-friendly manner, what we attempted in
this paper. A brief overview of both subjects would help to
comprehend the remaining parts of the discussion well, and
therefore, is presented afterwards.
A. Blockchain
Blockchain has gained attention from both industry and
academia because of the rapid popularity of the crypto-
currencies like Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [2]. Blockchain is
the foundational technology that enables crypto-currencies.
It has unique and interesting characteristics, such as im-
mutability, decentralization, data persistence, data provenance,
distributed control with accountability and transparency. With
all these properties, a blockchain is essentially a distributed,
always available, irreversible, tamper resistant, replicated pub-
lic repository of data where trustless users can agree on an
immutable and auditable piece of data without any third party
interaction [3]. Smart-contract is a mechanism that allows to
deploy irreversible and autonomous computational logic on
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top of blockchain. There are mainly two types of blockchain:
a public blockchain is accessible by anyone whereas a private
blockchain can set access rules to define who has acesss to
the blockchain data.
B. Smart car
Smart car is a system, which collects information about
its different components and processes these information to
provide added-value features to the car owner [4]. It improves
the car owner experience and the car safety. It also enables
to communicate with other smart cars and provides different
types of telemetries. Understandably, many of the generated
data is sensitive in nature. Being a newer domain, it has several
issues as illustrated below:
• Privacy: Many of the generated data is sensitive in
nature.
• Security: Apart from the security of the crucial internal
components of a smart car, the data generated by smart
cars lacks any proper mechanism to guarantee the confi-
dentiality, authenticity and integrity.
• Holistic view: The size of data generated by different
sensors of a smart can be huge. Even worse is that there
are third parties, e.g. garages, smart infrastructures and
so on, who might have data about the smart car. The
scattered nature of such data makes it difficult for any
owner to have a holistic view during the lifespan of a
smart car.
• Sharing: The traditional approach makes it difficult to
share smart car data in a secure, privacy-friendly and
auditable way among different parties.
Over the last few years, researchers have published dif-
ferent research works related to security and privacy issues
in smart or connected car. For example, in [5], Rouf et. al.
have presented the security and privacy vulnerabilities in the
wireless network of the smart car. Woo et al have demonstrated
a long-range wireless attack using a real vehicle and malicious
smartphone application in a connected car environment in
[6]. Dorri et al. have proposed a blockchain based system
to overcome the security and privacy issues in smart car [7].
They have demonstrated remote software updates and dynamic
vehicle insurance fees using blockchain. However, they have
not provided any mechanism to share car related data with
other interested parties or how to build a holistic view of smart
car data.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In this section, we present our idea of how we can conceptu-
ally represent the holistic view of a smart car data using a novel
concept called the autobiography of a smart car. To concretize
the semantic of the concept, we also build a mathematical
model.
As per the ENISA report [4], a smart car have the follow-
ing components where each components have multiple sub-
components/sensors .
• Powertrain control: engine control, transmission control,
speed and gear control, power train sensors and so on.
• Chassis control: Steering control, braking system, ADAS
(Advanced Driver Assistance System) systems and so on.
• Body control: Door locking, air conditioning sensor, light
sensors, seatbelt sensor and so on.
• Infotainment control: Audio-visual unit, navigation, ex-
ternal media unit and so on.
• Communications control: Gateway ECUs (Engine Con-
trol Units), telematics, Communication unit and so on.
• Diagnostic and maintenance systems: OBD (On-board
Diagnostics) ports, external aftermarket dongles and so
on.
Each of these component/sensors can generate data. Since
these components are internal as far as a smart car is
concerned, we call them internal sources. However, there
could be data sources which are external, such as a garage
providing a yearly fitness certificate, Government transport
authority providing a yearly tax certificate as well as regis-
tration certificates and even other vehicles (enabling Vehicle
to Vehicle communication) or infrastructures (enabling Vehicle
to Infrastructure communication).
Now, we gradually build the mathematical model by de-
noting the set of smart cars with VEC . We develop the
mathematical model from the perspective of a smart car
vec ∈ VEC . The set of other cars is presented using the
notation V EC ′, such that VEC ′ , {VEC \ vec}.
We use the notation Svec to denote the set of internal
sources of the smart car vec. The external sources, as we
consider within the scope of this paper, consist of other
vehicles (belonging to the set VEC ′), set of infrastructures
(denoted with INF ) and set of organizations (denoted with
O). Garages and other regulatory bodies are examples of dif-
ferent organizations within the scope of this paper. Therefore,
the set of external sources, denoted with Se is defined as:
Se , {VEC ′ ∪ INF ∪O}.
Then, we can define Svec (the set of all sources) from the
perspective of the smart car vec as the union of its internal
and external sources. Thus,
Svec , {Svec ∪ Se}
Based on this foundation, we define the concepts of claim
and assertion from the perspective of a smart car:
Definition 1. Claim: A claim is a statement about a smart car
consisting of information, relevant to that smart car, generated
either by one of the internal sources or by an external source.
The information, thus, can be anything generated by a single
sensor. Alternatively, this information can also be generated
by another vehicle, by an infrastructure (e.g. traffic light) or
by any regulatory or authorized entity.
Definition 2. Assertion: An assertion is a signed collection
of claims. We differentiate between two types of assertions:
internal or external. An internal assertion is the collection of
claims where each claim is generated by one of the internal
sources of the car and signed by the private key of the
smart car. On the other hand, an external assertion is a
collection of claims produced by one of the external sources
and subsequently signed by the respective private key of the
source.
Practically, a claim can be represented using a structured
data consisting of name-value pairs where a name presents
a property and the value its corresponding information. This
concept of structured data can be utilized to formalize the
notion of a claim. Let Csvec denote the set of claims for a car
vec generated by an internal source s ∈ Svec . Then, a claim
c ∈ Csvec can be defined in the following way:
c , 〈 (n1, v1), (n2, v2), (n3, v3)...(nj , vj) 〉
Here, n represents the name of the property, v presents its
value and j ∈ N.
Similarly, we can denote the set of claims for a car vec
generated by an external source s′ ∈ Se using the notation:
Cs
′
vec where each single claim consists of name-value pairs as
defined before for an external source. A visual illustration of
claims is presented in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: Claims from different sources
An internal assertion, denoted as Xvec for a car vec, can
be modelled as a set containing the signed union of all claims
generated by the internal sources of a car and defined it in the
following way:
Xvec ,
〈 { ⋃
s∈Svec
Csvec
}
K−1vec
〉
Here, K−1vec represents the private key of the vehicle vec.
Finally, we can define an assertion provided by an external
source (s′ ∈ Se) regarding a vehicle vec in the following way:
Xs
′
vec ,
〈 {
Cs
′
vec
}
K−1
s′
〉
Next, we provide a definition of the autobiography of a
smart-car:
Definition 3. Autobiography: The autobiography of a smart
is defined as the collections of internal and external assertions
generated throughout its lifespan.
Denoted with BIOvec to represent the autobiography of a
smart car vec, we define it in the following way:
BIOvec ,
〈
Xvec
⋃{ ⋃
s′∈Se
Xs
′
vec
} 〉
This definition is visually presented in Figure 2
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Fig. 2: Modelled autobiography of a smart car
According of this definition of the autobiography, it consists
of every piece of information generated by every single
internal and external source over the lifespan of a car. Un-
derstandably, this can be a large collection of information and
might be unsuitable or even not required for exchange and
sharing with parties. For such scenarios, we introduce a novel
terminology called Snapshot, defined in the following way:
Definition 4. Snapshot: The snapshot of a smart car (denoted
with SNAPvec for a smart car vec) is the collections of inter-
nal and external assertions generated with only the required
information from the respective sources.
Essentially, it is created with the subset of information
generated and signed by the respective source. Intuitively, it
can be modelled in the following way:
SNAPvec ,
〈
Xvec
⋃{ ⋃
s′∈Se
X s′vec
} 〉
Here, Xvec ⊆ Xvec and X s′vec ⊆ Xs
′
vec .
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we present the proposed system with the sole
purpose to tackle the identified issues. We start with a threat
model (Section IV-A) and requirement analysis to mitigate
such threats (Section IV-B), then propose an architecture (Sec-
tion IV-C) and finally analyze the architecture (Section IV-D).
A. Threat Model
Threat modelling is one of the mostly used methods to
identify, communicate, and understand threats and mitigation
mechanisms within the context of protecting (IT) assets,
smart car in the context of this paper. However, it is highly
dependant on the capabilities of the attacker that is assumed
for a particular system. Traditionally, the capabilities of an
attackers are presented using an adversary model, One of
the most well known adversary models is the Honest-But-
Curious model [8] which assumes that an attacker participates
in the protocol of the system and behaves correctly. She can
intercept, send (or receive) any message to (or from) the
protocol to which it participates. However, she cannot modify
any message or launch other types of attacks. We believe this is
quite restrictive in the sense that modern attackers can exhibit
additional capabilities.
We also differentiate between two types of attackers namely
internal attacker who is the owner of the car motivated to
gain illicit advantages by fabricating sensor generated data
(e.g. odometer) and external attacker who can be either an
individual other than the owner or an organization whose
main motivation is to act maliciously by getting hold of
data from the smart car or disrupting its system or other
external systems which might deal with the autobiography
of the smart car. With this conjecture in mind, we also
assume that an attacker can i) intercept as well as modify any
network packets transmitted over an insecure communication
channel, ii) disrupt the internal system of the smart car or
other external systems which deal with the autobiography of
the smart car, iii) gain unauthorized access only if she has
access to the required credential, e.g. username/password pair
or secret key, and iv) try to alter data generated by different
sensors stored within a smart car which ultimately will alter
the autobiography of a smart car.
Considering the above capabilities, we have chosen a well
established threat model called STRIDE [10] developed by
Microsoft. The STRIDE model is briefly presented below.
• T1-Spoofing Identity: The act of spoofing refers to an
adversary using the identity of an authorized user (e.g.
owner) to illegally access or modify resources on a system
where they would normally do not have any access.
• T2-Tampering with Data: As many of the user data
remains under the control of the users, they can change
the value of the data (e.g., odometer reading). Therefore,
the integrity of the data can be lost.
• T3-Repudiation: This involves a user or attacker who
leverages the inability of a system to track invalid and
illegal actions and uses them to gain some advantages in
the system.
• T4-Information Disclosure: Private or sensitive data
stored in a smart car may be leaked when the car is sold
to another user.
• T5-Denial of Service: The system that is used to access
the smart car data or to share the autobiography can be
the target of a denial of service attack.
• T6-Elevation of privilege: Malicious software with
potential exploitable vulnerabilities may be the first step
to gain access to external systems (e.g. systems utilized
by garages or other TTPs), thus potentially gaining a
privileged access on a large set of vehicles.
Among all these threats, we exclude the elevation of priv-
ilege from our consideration for this paper. This is because
such a threat is more relevant for enterprise systems. Besides,
with the involvement of very sensitive private data handled by
smart cars, we must also consider the privacy threats related
to the lack of control, an addition to the standard STRIDE
model.
• T7-Lack of control: The owner has no or little control
regarding how data of the smart car is shared with other
entities.
B. Requirement Analysis
In this section, we present a set of security and privacy
requirements which can be utilized to mitigate the identified
threats. The security requirements are:
• S1: The data generated in a smart car must be stored in
a secure way with a guarantee of its confidentiality and
integrity.
• S2: Data relevant to the smart car must be transmitted
over a secure channel.
• S3: There must be a secure way to access the data
and create an autobiography with strong guarantee of its
integrity. This mitigates T1.
• S4: The sharing of the car data must be carried out
in a secure, transparent and accountable fashion. S4 in
combination with S1 can tackle T4.
• S5: The authenticity and non-repudiation of data must
be guaranteed. S5 in combination with S1, S2 and S3 can
mitigate T2 and T3.
• S6: A distributed system should be leveraged in order to
minimize the impact of any DoS attack on the relevant
system. This tackles T5.
Next, the privacy requirements are presented:
• P1: The sharing platform must satisfy the selective dis-
closure property, allowing the owner to build an autobi-
ography with the full control over the data.
• P2: The autobiography must be shared with the explicit
consent of the owner. P1 and P2 combinedly can mitigate
T7.
C. Architecture
The architecture of the proposed platform is presented
in Figure 3. A brief overview of different aspects of the
architecture is provided next.
The architecture is centered around a smart-contract sup-
ported blockchain platform. Different nodes connected to the
blockchain network are the smart car vendors, smart cars, dif-
ferent government regulatory agencies, car insurers and other
third party service providers such as garages. The car vendor
during the production of the car (denoted as vec ∈ VEC ) will
generate a key-pair (public key Kvec and private key K−1vec)
utilizing the blockchain platform. The private key is stored in
a tamper-proof hardware of the smart car while the public key
is included as a digital certificate signed by the vendor.
A smart car generates different claims in its lifespan.
However, for simplicity, we make the assumptions that i) a
smart car is always connected to the network, ii) a claim
is generated in a specified duration where and is stored in
the internal storage of the smart car and its hash is stored
Smart-contract supported
Blockchain platform
Car vendor Govt. agency
Garage
Insurer
DApp
Fig. 3: Architecture of the proposed platform
in the blockchain via a transaction signed by the private key
of the car, and iii) an internal assertion is created when a
trip is completed where the assertion is stored in the internal
storage of the car and its hash is stored in the blockchain via
a transaction which is signed by the private key of the car.
The owner of a smart car can always connect to the smart
car to download different claims and assertions either via
a web, mobile or a desktop app and store them securely
in encrypted formats in an external storage of the owner.
We assume that the car vendor provides such an application
along with a decentralized application (the so called DApp) to
interface with the blockchain platform. Whenever such data
is downloaded from the smart car, the integrity of each data
is checked with its corresponding hash from the blockchain.
If the hashes do not match, it implies that the data stored in
the smart car has been altered and hence, an error message is
displayed to the user and a marker is set to signify this.
Intuitively, a smart contract will be utilized for each user
by which different information (mostly the hashes) regard-
ing the respective smart car will be stored or retrieved.
In addition, other nodes will also utilize their own smart
contract to facilitate different functionalities. One of the core
functionalities is the sharing of assertions, e.g. a tax certificate
and a fitness certificate, between different entities within the
platform. We envision the following way for the transfer of
external assertions to the owner of a smart car.
We assume a Repository smart contract that holds the
identity of the car, its corresponding public key and the
address of the smart contract for all relevant entities within the
network. In such, this smart contract will be the one-stop entry
to retrieve the identity-public key pair or the identity-smart
contract address pair for a particular entity in the network. This
Repository contract can be maintained by the vendor itself or
by any third party.
When an external third party would like to share an external
assertion it can retrieve required information, public key and
address of the respective smart contract, by just looking up in
the Repository smart contract. Then, the third party can just
create an assertion, optionally encrypt it with the public key
of the car and then send over the respective smart contract of
the car via a signed transaction. Once the car smart contract
receives the transaction, it notifies the owner and upon being
approved, the assertion is then stored in the smart contract,
which later can be retrieved using any preferred device.
The owner can use an app to combine different internal
and external assertions (Xvec and XS
′
vec) into an autobiogra-
phy (BIOvec) of the smart car with its hash stored in the
blockchain. Eventually, when the autobiography is re-updated,
the hash is also updated.
The size of such an autobiography will be a significant issue
when data from different sensors is combined. Additionally,
having the whole spectrum of data into the autobiography will
raise different privacy questions. That is why it might not be
ideal to share it with an external entity (e.g. an insurer). To-
wards that aim, a user can choose the information that is to be
shared to create a snapshot of the autobiography (SNAPvec).
The owner then looks into the Repository smart contract to
retrieve the public key and smart contract address of the
external entity and sends the snapshopt to the smart contract.
The snapshopt can be encrypted for additional security using
the public key of the external entity. Once the smart contract
of the external entity receives the snapshot it goes through the
same verification process as described before.
When the ownership of a smart car changes, the architecture
proposes a special type of ownership transactions, initiated
by the new owner and verified by a smart contract of a
Government agency, which would do the following steps:
• Create an assertion from an aggregated version of all
claims from the car as generated while in the possession
of the previous owner in a privacy friendly way. This is
to ensure that the new owner cannot get hold of sensitive
private data (e.g. driving locations) of the old owner
while preserving the essence of the usage of the car. One
example of this is that the new assertion contains the total
mileage of the smart car under the old owner instead of
fine-grained details of where, when and for how long the
car was driven previously.
• Import all data (mainly assertions) from the correspond-
ing smart contract under the old owner and create a new
smart contract under the new owner.
• Destroy the old smart contract in such a way that there
is no way to retrieve data from it.
These steps will ensure that the important information re-
garding the smart car does not get lost with the change of
ownership while preserving the privacy of the old owner.
D. Analysis & Design Choice
In this section we analyze the ways the proposed archi-
tecture can satisfy different requirements. Data generated by
different sensors of the smart car is stored, as per the proposal,
either in a temper proof hardware while in the car storage or in
encrypted format when downloaded in an external storage or
stored in the different smart contracts in the form of assertions,
autobiography or snapshot. In addition their hashes are stored
in the blockchain, guaranteeing its integrity. All these satisfy
the S1 requirement.
The protocol for the architecture can be deployed in such a
way that data always is transmitted over an encrypted channel,
thereby satisfying S2. To ensure S3, the desktop, web or
mobile app should be equipped with a strong authentication
mechanism so that only the owner, or an authorized delegated
entity, can access as well as generate the autobiography or
the snapshot involving the car data. The proposal requires
that the hashes of the assertions as well as autobiography
and snapshot are stored in the blockchain. This creates an
immutable evidence for the corresponding element which
satisfies S3.
The sharing of assertions and snapshots is always carried
out within the blockchain via signed transactions. This creates
a transparent and auditable trails while ensuring the security
and thus satisfies S4. The signed assertions and transactions
provide a strong guarantee of authenticity and non-repudiation
as it is assumed only the authorized owner can utilize the
corresponding private keys. This satisfies S5. An added advan-
tage of a blockchain-supported platform is its decentralization
capabilities. This minimizes the impact of any DoS attack and
hence satisfies S6.
The proposed system advocates that each internal assertion
and the snapshot is created with the involvement and explicit
consent of the owner with the ultimate authority to decide
what information is to be included in such elements. This
satisfies P1 and P2. To realize such a proposal, there are
several design choices that need to be finalized. Firstly, the
type of a blockchain platform that needs to be utilized for the
proposal. We envision a private blockchain platform such as
Hyperledger Fabric [11]. This is because a private blockchain
offers a better support of privacy, scalability and throughput.
Secondly, the next issue is the responsibility to maintain
such a blockchain. We believe a consortium of car vendors,
Government bodies and third parties, as outlined in our paper,
can be an good choice. This will ensure a shared responsibility
between the inter-connected parties and greater benefits for
everyone involved within this ecosystem.
V. CONCLUSION
Privacy and security have been becoming more critical as
modern cars are getting smarter. The smart cars themselves
and participating organizations generate data about the vehicle
that remain under the custody of different parties includ-
ing the car owner. Building trust about the data, securing
storage and sharing data in a privacy-preserving manner are
amongst the main future challenges. In this paper, we have
proposed a system architecture that can address these three
challenges using blockchain technologies and a novel concept
called the “autobiography of a smart car”. The idea has
been mathematically formalized to concretize its semantic.
A threat model is used to derive the system requirements
for our proposed system, and finally, we have presented and
discussed our system architecture and how it meets all those
identified requirements. Overall, if our system is deployed, it
will provide a holistic view of data about any particular car,
and enable car owners to share their data with others in a
privacy-friendly way. We believe that it will pave down the
way for future research in this domain.
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